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PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY IN
COLORADO
STANTON D. ROSENBAUM*

This article deals with the interpretation the Colorado courts
have given to total and permanent disability insurance clauses.
Consideration will not be given to the application of the clause
to any specific type of disease or injury, except insofar as
it pertains to the general problem. Because of the variations in
the clauses themselves and in the circumstances of the individual
cases, it is impogsible to reduce the Colorado decisions upon this
subject to a definite formula. The type of policy provision to be
considered is usually termed a non-occupational or general disability policy. It indemnifies against total and permanent disability which prevents the insured from working. He is insured
as a man, not as a particular workman. He may recover only
upon proof that he is disabled from engaging in any gainful
occupation. This type of coverage may be included as an adjunct
to life insurance entitling insured to waiver of premiums and to
benefit payments. There is also a general accident and health
policy written by casualty insurance companies. The courts, in
dealing with the question, make no distinction between disability
clauses in accident policies and life insurance policies, so no such
distinction will here be attempted.
A typical disability clause which has been before the Colorado
Supreme Court on several occasions is the following: 1
Benefits will be paid when insured has become totally
disabled as the result of bodily injury or disease occurring after the issuance of this agreement, so as to be
prevented thereby from engaging in any business or
occupation and performing any work for compensation,
gain or profit ....
Colorado follows the liberal rule, and weight of authority,
that the total disability contemplated by an accident policy, or
a life insurance policy containing a disability clause, does not
mean a state of absolute helplessness. The total disability contemplated means inability to do all the substantial and material
acts necessary to the prosecution of the insured's business, in his
customary and usual manner.
In considering this subject, full regard must be had for the
fact that the actions involved were not in tort for damages but
were brought on the policy as a contract containing certain specific
terms and provisions and will be construed strongly against the
* Student University of Denver College of Law.
'This clause was found in policies issued by the Guardian Life Insurance
Company prior to 1950. The clause presently used by that company together
with reasons for the modification are set out later in this paper.
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insurer. The courts have recognized the fact that the purpose of
the policy is to indemnify the insured against disability and subsequent loss of 2wages and have construed the policy liberally
toward that end.
In the type of policy under consideration the most frequent
problem is the meaning of "total and permanent" disability. If
this phrase were to be construed strictly, it would mean that the
insured must be reduced to a state of coma or absolute paralysis.
In United States Casualty Co. v. Hanson,3 the Colorado court held
that neither party would intend such an interpretation.
In one of the first Colorado cases on this subject, the insurance
company maintained insured was not disabled because he was
able to make visits to his doctor and go out doors. The could held 4
that "the plaintiff might have been able to walk, he might have
been able to ride on the cars to his physician's office, and still be
entirely incapacitated for work or business." In that case insured
didn't carry on any part of his business. Going a step further,
there is presented the situation where insured is physically able.
to attend to a very minor part of his affairs.
EXTENT OF DISABILITY REQUIRED

In United States Casualty Co. v. Hanson, supra, insured traveled about the U. S. looking for medical aid to treat his ailment.
Insured was also able to give some attention to his business correspondence. The court held that since insured could not do "all
the substantial acts necessary to be done" in prosecuting his business insured was "totally" disabled within the terms of the provision.
Two of the leading cases in Colorado construing a disability
clause interpret the clause of the Guardian Life Ins. Co., previously set forth. In the first case, Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. McMurry,5 insured was suffering from multiple sclerosis. The evidence showed he was fifty per cent efficient, that he could still
drive a car and do various odd jobs, and had done such jobs
although not for remuneration. Insured had operated a farm for
a corporation, of which he was a stockholder, that held and operated several farms. The court split into two parts the clause providing benefits to be paid if insured has "become totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease so that he is and will
be permanently, continuously and wholly prevented thereby from
performing any work or from following any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit." The court said that the phrase
preceding the word "or" is conditioned on absolute helplessness.
Jennings v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 44 Colo. 70, 96 P. 982 (1908).
320 Colo. App. 393, 79 P. 176 (1905).
'The Mutual Benefit Association v. Nancarrow, 18 Colo. App. 274, 71 P.
423 (1903).
'105 Colo. 11, 94 P. 2d 1086 (1939).
2
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The phrase subsequent to the word "or" is to be determined by
what a reasonable man would believe to be a disability to follow
any occupation.
Construing what disables insured "from following any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit," the court said that
consideration must be given to whether insured had training or
education to fit him for any other type of employment. Insured
was disabled within the meaning of the policy if he was unable
to obtain work "he was fitted to do."
If insured was a lawyer, and because of illness unable to practice law but able to sell apples on a street corner, a strict construction of the disability clause would bar his recovery. In the McMurry case, there may be seen the first indication of a construction of the clause to mean a disability to perform the occupation
for which insured is trained and educated: "He had no training
to fit him for anything other than farming or some kind of mechanical work." As will be later demonstrated, the amount and
kind of work insured is able to do is an important factor in determining if insured is permanently and totally disabled.
PARTIAL ABILITY TO WORK

The leading and probably the most well-known case on disability insurance in Colorado is the case of Guardian Life Ins.
Co. v. Kortz.6 Kortz was a jeweler and suffered a heart and arthritic condition for which he claimed disability benefits. Conflicting evidence was introduced showing the length of time Kortz
was able to work in his store. As in the McMurry case, the court,
before considering if Kortz was disabled, considered the conditions
constituting disability. The court said that the words "so that
he is and will be permanently, continuously, and wholly prevented
thereby from performing any work for profit" are not a limitation
on the preceding words, "totally and permanently disabled by
bodily injury or disease." Within such clauses disability occurs
if it wholly prevents one from performing any work or from
following any occupation for remuneration or profit.
Even though Kortz was able to do down to his store for a
few hours a day, he was sufficiently disabled to collect benefits of
the policy. The court said: "Since utter helplessness need not
be shown to bring plaintiff within terms of the policy, testimony
that he could not perform, all the duties of his former employment, was admissible to show a disability." (Italics supplied.)
The court goes on to say that the California case of Erreca
v. Western States Life Ins. Co. et al.,7 has "sound reasoning and
supports our conclusion."
Because of the significance which the Colorado court, in the
Kortz case, gives Erreca v. Ins. Co., and because Colorado has
' 109 Colo. 330, 125 P. 2d 640 (1942).
119 Calif. 2d 338, 121, P. 2d 689 (1942).
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probably adopted the "sound reasoning" expressed therein, extensive quotation therefrom seems justified. The case shows the significance of disability to perform the occupation for which insured
is trained and educated.
Insured was a farmer who directly supervised his farms. He
personally tested the soil, rode a horse over the land inspecting
it, worked with his farm hands in the fields, and carried on secretarial functions of making contracts, leases, etc. His accident
policy provided for benefits "whenever the insured becomes wholly
disabled by bodily injury or disease so that he is prevented thereby
from engaging in any occupation, or performing any work whatsoever for remuneration or profit." Insured was thrown from a
horse and severely injured. His legs were injured but after partial
recovery insured was able to drive a car to his fields and do secretarial farm work. He was unable to ride a horse, walk over his
fields inspecting them, or work with his men. The insnrance company claimed that because he could drive a car and carry on the
secretarial work of making leases and contracts that he was not
permanently and totally disabled within the meaning of the policy.
The court held otherwise:
The courts have held that total disability exists,
within the meaning of the term "any occupation" as contained in a general disability clause, whenever the insured is incapacitated from following any substantial or
remunerative occupation for which he is fitted or qualified, mentally or physically, and by which he is able to
earn a livelihood. The authorities supporting this rule
define total disability which prevents the insured from
engaging in any occupation or performing any work for
compensation, as a disability which prevents his working
with reasonable continuity in his customary occupation
or in any other occupation in which he might reasonably
be expected to engage in view of his station and physical
and mental capacity.
This construction of the words "any occupation" is
based upon the theory that it is unreasonable to deprive
an uneducated laborer, disabled from performing any
manual work, of the benefits of his policy, because he
might notwithstanding those disabilities, with training
and study, pursue a profession at some future date, or
become an accountant or banker. And it would be equally
unreasonable to hold that a doctor, lawyer, or business
executive is not totally disabled from engaging in "any
occupation" or performing "any work" because he is
able to run a news stand or work as a day laborer.
The disability clause explicitly conditions insurance
company's liability upon a total disability which prevents
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him "from engaging in any occupation, or performing
any work whatsoever for remuneration or profit." Nevertheless, and although respondent is a shrewd farm executive and a successful grain operator, the testimony discloses that he has had little formal education and is
neither trained nor qualified for any other occupation.
And because of his age and experience in life, he probably could not prepare himself for other remunerative
employment. Accordingly, the respondent must be deemed
to be totally disabled if he is no longer able to pursue the
occupation of farmer or farm supervisor.
*
recovery is not precluded under a total disability provision because the insured is able to perform
sporadic tasks, or give attention to simple or inconsequential details incident to the conduct of business.
It is interesting to note that in the Kortz case the disability
was brought about by disease, while in the Erreca case, which
the Colorado case seems to follow, the disability was brought
about by accident. It seems that, regardless of its cause, the elements constituting disability are the same.
So far we have only considered cases where the court held
that the disability incurred came within the total and permanent
clause. Denton v. Prudential Insurance Co. 8 is a case in which
the court found that the disability of the insured was not total
and permanent. In that case insured suffered a heart attack on
April 30th. He returned to work the following day but did not
feel well and only worked until May 3rd. He returned to work
on May 16th. He was weak and short of breath. On several occasions he had fainting spells. It was frequently necessary for
him to sit down and rest during his work. Following his illness
his employer took some of his territory away and some of his
associates helped him with minor parts of his work. Insured continued working with no decrease in compensation. He sued to
recover under the terms of his policy, alleging permanent and
total disability. The court held that the insured was not so disabled as to be able to claim benefits. "The rule is that the insured
may not be regarded as totally disabled as of a time when, although sick, diseased, injured or otherwise afflicted, he continues
to do his ordinary work or is regularly performing his usual and
customary duties." Although insured wasn't literally performing
his "usual and customary duties," since his employer took some
of his territory away and his colleagues helped him, the insured
was undoubtedly performing a substantial part of his duties. Unquestionably the court was also influenced by the fact that insured
continued to receive the same compensation during the time of
his alleged disability as he had received prior to his illness. It
' 100 Colo. 293, 67 P. 2d 77 (1937).
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will be made apparent that this compensation factor does affect
the problem of whether insured is considered disabled.
HousE CONFINEMENT
Before going into that problem, however, it might be well
to consider the house confinement clause that appears in some
policies. In the case of Jennings v. Brotherhood,9 the policy provided that: "A disability, to constitute a claim for indemnity for
sickness only, shall be continuous, complete and total, requiring,
As in the
. . ."
absolute, necessary confinement to the house
clause requiring total and permanent disability, the courts have
construed this house confinement clause liberally. If construed
strictly it would require that insured never, under any circumstances, leave his house. The courts have allowed recovery of
benefits where insured left his house to visit his physician or to
gain the benefit of the sunshine and fresh air.
OTHER INCOME

The purpose of disability insurance is to provide necessities,
not income. Most insurance companies only allow an amount of
insurance based on a percentage of his net income, usually fifty
percent. Doctors and dentists are not considered as good risks
and are usually only eligible for an amount up to one-third of
their net income. Some companies pro-rate the benefits they will
pay based on the amount insured receives from other health and
accident policies he holds. The problem arises as to whether insured may receive insurance benefit payments if he is disabled
but receives income from other sources, such as investments or
sick leave pay. Colorado seems to hold that such private income
makes no difference, if insured is in fact disabled. In Denton v.
Prudential Ins., supra, the insured still continued to receive his
full salary. In construing the policy the court considered this
salary factor and said that the compensation or profit received
must be remunerative and not merely nominally so. That if it is
remunerative insured is not totally and permanently disabled
within the meaning of the contract.
In Guardian Life v. Kortz, supra, the defendant insurance
company contended that because plaintiff, during the period for
which he claimed disability benefits, received wages or remuneration from his company (Sixty per cent of the stock was owned
by him. The remainder was owned by a brother-in-law whom
plaintiff had taken into the business and trained from boyhood.)
was proof that during such period insured was not disabled. The
court was unable to agree with the company's contention, saying:
944 Colo. 70, 96 P. 982 (1908). See also Mutual Benefit Assoc. v. Nancarrow,
18 Colo. App. 274, 71 P. 423 (1903) and Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assoc.
v. McDonald, 73 Colo. 308, 215 P. 135 (1923).
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Under some circumstances where employer and employee are strangers, such fact might be very strong evidence of no disability. It is pertinent to note that the
policy does not provide indemnity if plaintiff does not
receive a salary, but if he is disabled to the extent therein
specified. Receiving a salary from a stranger, who had
no personal or sentimental reason for paying him except for services that were of value, would be one thing;
that he was paid by a corporation owned principally by
himself and partly by his brother-in-law, who was under
obligations to him, is quite another.
And in Erreca v. Western States Life, supra, which the Kortz
case said used "sound reasoning and supports our conclusion,"
the court there said that the magnitude of insured's enterprise
and income therefrom have no proper place in the determination
of whether insured is totally disabled from performing remunerative work.
SURGERY

In certain types of injuries or sickness the disability can be
corrected by surgery. Is insured required to undergo surgery to
correct the disability? Under Colorado state decisions insured is
not required to undergo an operation if corrective surgery is not
made a condition precedent in the policy. If the operation is a
minor one, involving little risk, and was suggested as a normal
procedure by insured's own physician, it might be held that insured could not collect benefits. The leading Colorado case ohi
this subject is Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Matz. 10 The company there contended that, in aid of recovery, insured should be
required to submit to a surgical operation which, seemingly, he
had declined to undergo. The company offered to prove, by two
reputable physicians of its choosing, that insured was suffering
from osteomyelitis of the tibia, that the indicated method of
treatment was an operation. The company said that both doctors
would testify that the operation was recognized as the correct
treatment for osteomyelitis, that the operation was not inherently
dangerous to life or health, that the operation was not extremely
painful, and that an operation offered better than a ninety per
cent chance of complete recovery. The offer was rejected by the
trial court. The supreme court upheld the trial court saying that
insured "is under no contractual obligation to so submit and
thereby incur expense and risk his life so that insurer might be
relieved of its liability to him."
In Roderick v. Metropolitan Life,". cited in the Matz case,
the doctrine of estoppel is considered. There the insured was suf10102 Colo. 587, 81 P. 2d 775 (1938).
1125 Mo. App. 852, 98 S.W. 2d 983 (1936).
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fering from a bladder condition which insured's attending physician said rendered insured unable to work. The physician did
admit the possibility of a cure through a serious but not necessarily dangerous operation. The physician had not suggested
such operation to insured. The court held that the doctrine of
estoppel would not apply. Estoppel was said to be applicable
only when it is shown that the disability might be cured if insured
would be willing to comply with the course of treatment prescribed
for him by his own doctor. In this case, however, there was no
showing that the doctor or any other physician had ever suggested
to plaintiff that he should have an operation for his bladder trou*ble, so there was no proof of a refusal on his part and thus no
grounds to claim estoppel.
The federal case of Home Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,12 (reversing the Colorado case Stewart v. Home Life Ins.13 ), also deals
with the subject of surgery as a prerequisite to recovery of benefits. This case may be authority for arguing that in some instances possible correction of disability by surgery may disqualify
insured from benefits. In this case insured suffered a cataract
condition. The lens of both eyes were removed by surgery. Without the use of glasses the plaintiff had no useful sight in an
economic or industrial sense. With glasses he had normal vision
and became engaged in an occupation for compensation and profit.
The plaintiff underwent an operation and wore glasses by his
own volition. He sought recovery under a policy which read: "The
irrecoverable loss of sight in both eyes . . . . shall constitute
total and permanent disability within the meaning of this contract . . . ." The court held that because insured had recovered
his sight he couldn't recover benefits, saying that the coverage
was limited to loss of function and did not embrace the loss of
any part of the physical eye and that the loss must be irrecoverable.
DUTY TO CORRECT DISABILITY

This case can be distinguished from the preceding cases in
that the policy here stipulated "irrecoverable loss." Would insured be able to recover benefits if his policy stipulated "permanent and total disability," instead of "irrecoverable loss"? The
Matz case holds that insured, under such a clause, is under no
duty to undergo an operation to correct his disability. What if
insured voluntarily underwent surgery, as in the Home Life case?
It would seem unjust to deprive insured of benefits because he
had "commendable coverage" and voluntarily submitted to surgery
when it was not required. Yet, the Home Life case seems to hold
that insured would be disqualified from benefit payments if surgery
corrects his disability.
12114 F. Rep, 2d 516 10th Cir., (1940).
"129 F. Supp. 834, Dist. Colo. (1939).
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In the Home Life case what would be the decision if insured
had refused to undergo surgery? The course nicely sidesteps this
problem by saying, "we do not explore that question because with
commendable courage he voluntarily underwent two operations."
However, the court cites Southland Life v. Dunn 14 as being in
accord with its opinion. In the Southland case insured had refused
to undergo surgery for his cataract. The court there held that
because minor surgery, under little danger, could correct his disability he could not recover benefits even though he was physically
disabled, since this disability could be corrected with little difficulty. It would thus seem that in the Federal District Court for
Colorado, the Matz case has, to an extent, been nullified.
ARTIFICIAL CORRECTION

Closely akin to the problem of whether insured must undergo
surgery to, if possible, correct his disability, is the problem of
corrected disability by artificial means. When a man loses a hand
and has it replaced with an artificial hook can he still receive
benefits under his policy? Although there are few Colorado cases
on the subject, it would seem that he could continue to receive
benefit payments. Two out of the three cases on this subject concern themselves with the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is
recognized that such decisions are an interpretation of a statute
but it would seem that they can be used for arguing similar situations occurring under a disability clause of a health and accident
policy.
In Mark Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 15 (cited in Great
American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm., post), the plaintiff
sued for disability benefits under workmen's compensation. He
had suffered the loss of a hand but an artificial hand with which
he was able to continue working at the same job performing similar acts. The court there held that because he was able to some
extent perform the same work with the artificial hand was no
reason to deny him benefits. "It is enough that the normal use
...
. has been taken entirely away."
Would an eye disability corrected by glasses disqualify insured
from benefit payments? This question has not been directly answered by the Colorado courts. It has not been directly decided
because in one case the Federal court is dealing with a clause
stipulating "irrecoverable" loss of sight, Home Life Ins. v. Stewart,
supra. In the other case the Colorado supreme court is dealing
with the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Great American Indemnity
16
Co. v. Industrial Comm.
In comparison with artificial limbs, glasses are not an unusual part of a person's habiliment. In Home Life Ins. v. Stewart,
2471 S.W. 2d 1103.
15286 Ill. 620, 122 N.E. 84 (1919).
18114 Colo. 91, 162 P. 2d 413 (1945).

April, 1952

DICTA

the court pointed out that "glasses are worn by a substantial proportion of people of all ages. Many of them have very little vision
in the natural eye, but with the use of glasses their vision is substantially normal for all practical purposes. They pursue their
business and professions with success. They meet in competition
those with normal vision in the natural eye, and they are not
seriously handicapped.
In Great American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra,
the problem arose as to whether the effect of corrective lenses
should be considered in awarding compensation for impaired vision
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court held that the
effect of glasses in correcting vision should not be considered in
awarding the statutory allowance.
In the Great American case the court gives an analogy between a disability corrected by an artificial limb and corrected
by glasses. The Federal court in the Home Life case says that no
such analogy exists, that the loss of both feet or both legs and the
use of cork or wooden substitutes, on one hand, and the loss of sight
in both eyes resulting from a cataractous condition and its restoration through surgery and the use of glasses, on the other, cannot
be regarded as closely akin to respect to disability. In general
concept they are so widely apart that they do not bear any reasonable analogy. The difference is too plain to call for elaboration.
Whether insured, under a total and permanent disability
clause, could continue to receive benefits if his eye disability was
corrected by glasses, cannot be determined from these cases. If
Colorado is going to continue to hold that insured need not undergo
surgery to correct a disability, it can be argued that insured need
not wear glasses to correct his disability. But if insured voluntarily wears glasses, which correct the disability, may he continue
to receive benefits? If corrected disability by surgery may be
compared to correction by artificial means, then under Home Life
Ins. v. Stewart if insured wore glasses correcting his vision he
could not continue to receive benefits. On the other hand, in the
Great American case the Supreme Court of Colorado held that
it would not even consider the effect of glasses in relation to receipt of benefits under workmen's compensation. Would the court
consider glasses in regard to health and accident insurance? It
is possible that Colorado would follow its reasoning in the Great
American case and consider the Federal case of Home Life a
black sheep, both as to correcting disability by surgery and corrected disability by glasses.
An interesting case would be an attempt to collect disability
benefits for an injury. to an artificial limb. If insured had an artificial limb when he took out his policy and this limb were subsequently destroyed, could insured collect benefits for his disability
until another limb could be manufactured? It is doubtful if such
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recovery could be had. Colorado has no decisions on this point.
However, another Industrial Commission case, London Guarantee
and Accident Co. v. Industrial Comm, 7 would seem good authority
for supporting a conclusion of no recovery. The district court
gave judgment affirming an award of the Industrial Commission
for accidental injury to a wooden leg. In reversing the decision
the supreme court said:
Compensation can be awarded for personal injuries
only, which means injury to the person. A wooden leg
is a man's property, not part of his person, and no compensation can be awarded for its injury.
It is interesting to note the effect that the foregoing decisions
have had upon The Guardian Life clause. Compare the clause cited
at the beginning of this article with the clause that the Guardian
Life Insurance Company has used in its policies since 1950. It
has changed its clause to read:
Total disability is defined as incapacity of the insured, resulting from bodily injury or disease which prevents him from performing substantially all of the work
pertaining to his occupation or any other occupation for
which he is or may be suited by education, training or
experience. The entire and irrecoverable loss of the sight
of both eyes, or the use of both hands, or both feet or of
one hand and one foot, is considered to be total disability.
In the years to come another law student may have occasion
an article on this "new" clause and the court's construcwrite
to
tion of it.
INVITATION TO YELLOWSTONE MEETING
All Colorado lawyers and their families are invited to attend
the first regional meeting of the American Bar Association to be
held in this area. All facilities of Yellowstone National Park will
be surrendered to the legal profession on June 17 to 21, 1952, and
attorneys from Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming will participate.
In conjunction with this convention, there will be Institutes
on Oil and Gas, Taxation, Legal Draftsmanship and Trial Tactics
and there will be meetings of the Junior Bar Conference and Sections on Administrative Law, Labor Law, Judicial Administration,
Insurance Law and Mineral Law. On the lighter side, there will
be dancing and other entertainment every night, and sightseeing
tours and boat rides during the day to complete your family holiday.
For further literature, registration forms or other information, contact the Bar Association Secretary, Terry J. O'Neill, 1726
Champa Street, Denver.
" 80 Colo. 162, 249 P. 642 (1923).

